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Abstract Creating accountable care organizations (ACOs)
has been widely discussed as a strategy to control rapidly
rising healthcare costs and improve quality of care; however,
building an effective ACO is a complex process involving
multiple stakeholders (payers, providers, patients) with their
own interests. Also, implementation of an ACO is costly in
terms of time and money. Immature design could cause safety
hazards. Therefore, there is a need for analytical model-based
decision-support tools that can predict the outcomes of differ-
ent strategies to facilitate ACO design and implementation. In
this study, an agent-based simulation model was developed to
study ACOs that considers payers, healthcare providers, and
patients as agents under the shared saving payment model of
care for congestive heart failure (CHF), one of the most
expensive causes of sometimes preventable hospitalizations.
The agent-based simulation model has identified the critical
determinants for the payment model design that can motivate
provider behavior changes to achieve maximum financial and
quality outcomes of an ACO. The results show nonlinear
provider behavior change patterns corresponding to changes
in payment model designs. The outcomes vary by providers
with different quality or financial priorities, and are most
sensitive to the cost-effectiveness of CHF interventions that
an ACO implements. This study demonstrates an increasingly
important method to construct a healthcare system analytics
model that can help inform health policy and healthcare
management decisions. The study also points out that the
likely success of an ACO is interdependent with payment
model design, provider characteristics, and cost and effective-
ness of healthcare interventions.
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1 Introduction
The current health system in the United States lacks mecha-
nisms and incentives for providers to control rapidly rising
healthcare costs and improve quality of care [1]. Hence, an
idea was proposed in 2007 of an accountable care organiza-
tion (ACO), a group of providers who accept greater account-
ability for total costs and quality of care [2, 3]; this has been
widely discussed since it was outlined in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act [4] in 2010. The Centers for Medi-
care &Medicaid Services (CMS) have established aMedicare
Shared Savings Program to create ACOs implementing shared
saving payment models [5]. In addition, many private insurers
and healthcare organizations have launched or will launch
their ACO demonstrations in the near future [6].
However, an ACO could implement a broad range of
delivery and payment models (capitation, bundled payment,
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An agent-based simulation model to study accountable care
organizations
shared saving) [7]; it is unclear how ACOs should be struc-
tured and implemented [8] to deliver high-quality care and
control spending. Meanwhile, an ACO demonstration is cost-
ly in terms of time and money and could cause safety hazards
because of immature design. Therefore, the design and imple-
mentation of ACOs are complex and risky, and there is a need
for predictive analytics tools that can predict future outcomes
of different ACO models and generate recommendations
based on goals set by policymakers.
Industrial and Systems Engineering (ISE) methods have the
potential to address this need. However, traditional ISE ap-
proaches are facing challenges in modeling some important
features of an ACO, which is composed of multiple interacting
individual stakeholders from multiple sectors–including
payers, providers, and patients–who are working to maximize
their own interests. Consequently, the Agency for Healthcare
Research&Quality (AHRQ) has called for methodologies that
can incorporate different objectives and behaviors of multiple
interacting stakeholders from different sectors into the model
and make optimal recommendations for the overall system [9];
AHRQ has identified the methodologies as a critical area of
ISE research in healthcare.
The main contribution of this article is that an agent-based
model was developed to address the needs of predictive ana-
lytics for ACOs from a cross-sectoral point of view. By
combining different agents’ varying goals and behaviors from
their vantage points in a system model, the analysis reveals
new, integrated insights to help inform health policy and
healthcare management decisions. A simulation study that
analyzes ACOs aiming to deliver better care for congestive
heart failure (CHF) was also developed to demonstrate the use
of the agent-based model. CHF was selected in the model
because it is the leading cause for hospitalization and high
healthcare costs for elders [10]. In addition, multiple meta-
analyses of clinical trials have shown that interventions of
disease management programs could reduce CHF readmis-
sion rates and improve other health outcomes, including sur-
vival rates and quality of life [11, 12]. Therefore, payers and
ACOs have the potential to create incentives and mechanisms
to facilitate the adoption and implementation of this evidence-
based care. The goal of the agent-based simulation model is
not to substitute an ACO pilot program but to facilitate ACO
design and implementation processes by providing analytic
supports for decision-makers to make informed decisions.
A shared saving payment model for the ACOs was exam-
ined in the agent-based model because it is a popular payment
model used in the CMS Shared Savings Program [5] and
many other current and planned ACO demonstrations. Fur-
thermore, it serves as an important bridge between the tradi-
tional fee-for-service model and more fundamental risk-
sharing payment models, such as episode-based payment.
Under shared saving payment, if a group of providers can
control or reduce the total healthcare costs of a patient
population while meeting quality measures, a portion of the
saving will be awarded to the providers.
In this paper, Section 2 describes the agent-based model
developed and a simulation study to demonstrate the model.
Section 3 presents the results of the simulation study. A
baseline analysis was conducted to compare the performance
of an ACO health network and a controlled health network. In
addition, multiple scenario analyses were conducted to exam-
ine the impacts of payment model designs and provider char-
acteristics on the outcome measures.
2 Method
In this chapter, the agent-based model developed to provide
predictive analytics for ACOs is described, followed by the
modeling settings of the simulation study for CHF patients.
Section 2.1 briefly introduces the methodology of agent-based
modeling and its advantages to model ACOs. Section 2.2
describes the framework of the agent-based model and the
designs of each type of agent, including agent’s objectives,
characteristics, behaviors, and how an agent interacts with
other agents. Section 2.3 provides a gain and cost analysis
from different agents’ perspectives in order to model agent
decision-making. Section 2.4 discusses the configurations of
the simulation run to demonstrate the model.
2.1 Agent-based modeling
Agent-based modeling (ABM) can be viewed as a mindset
rather than a specific modeling technique. ABM describes a
complex system from the bottom-up perspective and models it
as a collection of multiple autonomous agents who have their
own objectives, behaviors, and interactions with other agents
and the environment. As in the real world, global behaviors
and trends emerge from the behavior of and interactions
between individual agents [13, 14].
ABM can model individual behaviors of each stakeholder
in an ACO and their dynamic interactions. This is a limitation
and difficulty of traditional equation-based or discrete event
modeling approaches. Because providing coordinated care is
an essential part of an ACO, the ability to model agent
collaborations and communications is a required function for
an ACOmodel. The structure of ABMmakes it easy to define
dynamic agent interactions through functions such as message
passing and agent networks.
Because ABM does not require predefined aggregate level
flow and structure (as in SystemDynamics), it is more flexible
to expand through adding agent behaviors, interaction rules,
and learning capacity. In addition, working as a platform,
ABM can incorporate other modeling techniques. For exam-
ple, it can apply artificial intelligence to model agent behavior
changes and can incorporate stochastic process models to
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simulate agent internal state transitions. Furthermore, because
ABM models the system from the individual agent level, it
can take advantage of the increasing amount of individual
level data.
2.2 Model description
As shown in Fig. 1, the agent-based model includes three
types of agents who are the key stakeholders of an ACO
demonstration: the patient agent, the provider agent, and the
payer agent. Two classes of provider agents were defined
because they are the main providers involved in CHF care:
the hospital agent and primary care physician (PCP) agent.
Under each agent, there are modules, each of which represents
a set of related functions for the agent.
2.2.1 Patient agent
A patient agent denotes a Medicare patient whose age is 65 or
older. Each patient agent is characterized by four demographic
variables (age, race, gender, and income) and three health
condition variables (diabetes, hypertension, and CHF). These
variables were the key factors that have impacts on CHF
disease progression and healthcare utilization [15–18].
Patient agent characteristics were estimated from the Na-
tional Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES)
of 1999–2010. Because the variables of a patient agent are
correlated, the joint distribution of these variables was esti-
mated on the basis of a conditional probability model:













The patient agent’s CHF disease progression and
healthcare resource utilization are modeled in the patient agent
state transition module shown in Fig. 2. A patient agent starts
in either the CHF free state or CHF onsite state, depending on
whether the agent has CHF when he/she was generated. In the
CHF free state, a patient agent is exposed to the risk of
developing CHF in either the outpatient setting (moving to
the CHF onsite state) or the inpatient setting (moving to the
CHF-related hospitalization state). A patient agent in the CHF
onsite state is at risk of CHF-related hospitalization (moving
to the CHF-related hospitalization state). Patient agents in any
of the above states also have the possibility of death (moving
to the mortality state, in which case the patient agent will be
deleted from the simulation).
The CHF-related hospitalization was defined as a hospital-
ization in which CHF is listed in any of its first seven diagno-
ses. Because this model targets CHF care, non–CHF-related
hospitalizations were not included. In addition, patient agents
who have not been diagnosed with diabetes or hypertension
are exposed to the risks of developing diabetes or hyperten-
sion. Because CHF, diabetes, and hypertension are incurable
chronic diseases, once a patient agent develops any of these
diseases, he/she will have it for the rest of the simulation.
There is a wide range of cycle time in the CHF modeling
literature depending on the measurement needs of the studies
[19–21]. The cycle time in the patient state transition module
was set to half a month (15 days) in order to catch hospital
readmissions within 30 days since previous discharge. At each
cycle, a patient agent will move to other states or remain at the
current state according to state transition probabilities, which
are determined by the patient agent’s characteristic variables
and are adjusted if the patient agent receives the CHF inter-
vention care. The intervention here refers to the comprehen-
sive discharge planning with post-discharge follow-up. More
details about it can be found in Phillips et al. [12].
The impacts of these risk factors on the state transition
probabilities are derived from the literature and public health
surveys and statistics. First, the CHF incidence rate is risk-
adjusted by the patient’s age group [22], diabetes [23, 24], and
hypertension [16, 18, 24]. With regard to the mortality rate of
CHF patient agents, Curtis et al. [22] showed there is a
significant difference in mortality rate depending on whetherFig. 1 Agent-based model structure
Fig. 2 Patient agent transition model
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the patients were first diagnosed with CHF in an inpatient
setting or an outpatient setting. Thus, the diagnosis source was
added as a risk factor for mortality, and two separate survival
curves were constructed from data reported by Curtis et al.
[22] (shown in Table 1) for each diagnosis source.
For non-CHF patient agents, the mortality rate was esti-
mated from the U.S. life tables of 2006 [25]. The CHF-related
hospitalization rate was adjusted by age group based on the
estimations from Fang et al. [26] and Chen et al. [27] shown in
Table 2. Diabetes incidence rates were developed based on
McBean et al. [28], and hypertension incidence rates were
calculated from Dannenberg et al. [29] and Dischinger et al.
[30] as a function of patient’s race.
A patient agent generates inpatient care utilization by moving
into the CHF-related hospitalization state. For outpatient care
utilization, each patient agent’s regular outpatient visits were
modeled as a Poisson process because it is a common approach
to modeling patient arrivals [31–33]. The average number of
regular outpatient visits estimated from the literature ranges from
eight to ten visits per year [21, 34, 35]. Hence, the parameter of
the Poisson process is set to nine visits per year. In addition to
regular visits, a follow-up visit after hospital discharge will be
scheduled if a patient agent receives the intervention.
2.2.2 Provider agent
The model includes two types of provider agents: the hospital
agent and PCP agent; each represents a hospital or a PCP
clinic, respectively. The goal of a provider agent is to maxi-
mize the utility of the hospital or clinic by deciding whether to
conduct the CHF intervention.
The CHF intervention has been demonstrated by a number of
clinic trials and meta-analysis studies as able to reduce hospital
readmission and mortality rate for CHF patients [11, 12]. The
effects of the intervention are modeled by reduction in transition
probabilities to the CHF-related hospitalization state and mortal-
ity state. The risk reduction was derived from a meta-analysis of
CHF interventions [12]. The average risk reduction is 20 % for
CHF hospitalization rate and 13 % for CHF mortality rate.
Because most published CHF intervention studies involve
collaboration of hospitals and PCPs [11, 12], the full effects of
the intervention, it was assumed, could only be achieved when
both the hospital where a patient was admitted and the pa-
tient’s PCP conducted the intervention. If only one party was
conducting the intervention without collaboration with the
other party, the intervention could only achieve partial effect.
The well-established psychological theory, the Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB) [36], was applied as the framework
to model the provider agent decision-making. As shown in
Fig. 3, TPB suggests that a person’s actual behavior is deter-
mined by his/her intention to perform the behavior, and the
intention is influenced by three predicting factors: attitude,
subjective norm, and perceived behavior control (PBC).
Attitude in TPB is a person’s belief about the consequences
of a particular behavior. In the model, the provider agent’s
attitude toward the intervention is influenced by his/her finan-
cial return as well as his/her client’s health outcomesmeasured
by the CHF hospitalization rate and mortality rate. Hence,
attitude A of a provider agent is formalized as






k and EQ j+1
k are the expected profit and expected
quality performance, respectively, if behavior k will be per-
formed in year j+1. U is a function that transforms the ex-
pected profit or the expected quality performance into a utility
value from 0 to 1. β is a weight parameter that can be
configured by users.
Subjective norm is a person’s perception of whether people
important to him/her believe he/she should perform a behav-
ior. The provider agent’s subjective normwas defined in terms
of peer pressure, which is a provider agent’s perception of
other provider agents’ attitudes toward the intervention. The
perception of other agents’ attitudes is modeled through agent
Table 1 CHF survival curve
Time since onset of CHF Survival proportions
Outpatient diagnosis Inpatient diagnosis
0 1.00 1.00
30 days 0.98 0.84
1 years 0.87 0.66
5 years 0.49 0.33
Table 2 Transition probability from the CHF-diagnosed state to CHF-
related hospitalization
Age (years) Transition probability
65–74 (age group 1–2) 0.01663
75–84 (age group 3–4) 0.02360
> =85 (age group 5) 0.03489
Fig. 3 Application of the theory of planned behavior
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communication. Based on his/her current attitude toward the
CHF intervention, a provider agent will send a supportive
message either for the behavior of implementing the interven-
tion or for the opposite behavior of not implementing the
intervention to a random agent within his/her network. A
provider agent can then estimate other provider agents’ atti-
tudes based on the number of supportive messages received
for each behavior. Hence, the subjective norm is expressed by




k is the number of supportive messages received for
behavior k during year j, andUsn is a utility function that transfers
the number of messages into a utility value ranging from 0 to 1.
The third predicting factor, PBC, is a person’s perceived ease
or difficulty of performing a particular behavior. As the CHF
intervention is a collaborative behavior between hospitals and
PCPs, the effects of the intervention are compromised if only one
side of the agents conduct the intervention. Therefore, an agent’s
perceived ease or difficulty at successfully performing the inter-
vention is influenced by other agents’ behaviors. Hence, the PBC
of a provider agent is defined as the perception of the percentage
of other agents who are actually conducting the intervention. The
process was modeled through agent interactions between hospi-
tal agents and PCP agents. An interaction happenswhen a patient
agent is discharged and its hospital agent and PCP agent com-
municate to update the patient agent’s information and simulta-
neously to perceive if the other agent is conducting the
intervention.
The PBC for the behavior of conducting the intervention
(k=1) in year j+1 is formalized as
PBC1jþ1 ¼ ni j
.
ti j;
where nij is the number of interactions in which the other
agent is conducting intervention responses and tij is the total
number of interactions. Because an agent does not need any
collaboration from other agents to not conduct the intervention
(k=0), PBC j+1
0 was set to 1.
After the intention is formed, a softmax function can be
used to calculate the probability that a provider agent will








The parameter τ is used to adjust the irrational level of
decision-makers. In the demonstrating simulation study,
rational decision-making was assumed, so the behavior with
higher intention will be performed. The users of the agent-
based model can set the parameters to reasonable values for
their specific context or learn them empirically.
Last, to examine the impacts of provider characteristics,
three hypothetical types of provider agents were defined in the
demonstrating simulation study by varying the weights of
β=[β1, β2]. The three types of provider agents are profit-
oriented with β=[0.8, 0.2], quality-oriented with β=[0.2,
0.8], and neutral with β=[0.5, 0.5]. Scenario analyses with
different mixes of these three types of provider agents were
conducted and are described in Section 3.
2.2.3 Payer agent
The payer agent hypothetically represents CMS in the model
because it is the primary payer for CHF healthcare services.
(Note. In the text below, all references to CMS are hypothet-
ical. The study does not reflect the view of the CMS, rather
solely the views of the authors.) The CMSwill collect cost and
quality data, as well as calculate and distribute the shared
saving. To calculate the shared saving, two provider agent
networks were included: the ACO network and controlled
network, each of which serves a patient population with
identical patient characteristics. At the end of each year or
decision cycle, the total CHF-related healthcare costs per CHF
patient will be calculated for each network. The cost differ-
ence between these two networks is the saving per CHF
patient from the payer’s perspective.
One key parameter of the shared saving payment model is
shared saving rate (SSR), which defines the percentage of the
total saving that will be awarded to providers. The shared
saving per CHF patient is calculated bymultiplying the saving
per CHF patient with SSR, and the total shared saving is
determined by multiplying the shared saving per CHF patient
with the number of CHF patients that the ACO network
serves.
The total shared saving will then be distributed among
hospital agents and PCP agents in the ACO network. The
distribution of the shared saving is defined by another key
parameter: sharing rate to hospital (SRH), which is the per-
centage of the total shared saving distributed to hospital
agents. Within each type of provider agent, the shared saving
was assumed to be distributed equally. If the cost per CHF
patient of the ACO network is higher than that of the con-
trolled network, there will be no saving.
2.3 Healthcare costs
The cost analysis was conducted from different agents’ per-
spectives. The cost for the payer agent representing CMS is
the reimbursement paid to providers for CHF-related services
plus the shared saving. For CHF-related hospitalization, the
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AHRQ’s estimation [37] is used for costs of hospital service,
and the physician inpatient cost is estimated to be 18 % of the
reimbursement for hospital service [21, 38]. The reimburse-
ment for outpatient visits is determined by the CMS Physician
Fee Schedule [39].
For a hospital agent, negative margins were reported for
hospital services of Medicare patients [40, 41]. A −8.4 margin
for CHF inpatient services was estimated based onMedicare’s
reported reimbursement [42] and hospital operating costs [43,
44]. For CHF intervention cost, a meta-analysis of CHF
interventions [12] showed that the pooled intervention cost
was $108 per patient per month for a usually 6-month-long
intervention. The intervention effects were assumed to last for
1 year, which gives us an average cost of $54 per patient per
month.
A PCP agent’s operating cost was estimated to be 60 % of
its revenue [45]. The intervention cost from a PCP agent’s
perspective was defined as the opportunity cost of communi-
cating with CHF care managers. If the time used for commu-
nication was 15 min per patient per year, it could be otherwise
used for a standard outpatient visit reimbursed at $69 [39].
The healthcare costs are summarized in Table 3, and all values
are converted into USD (2011) using the U.S. Consumer Price
Index (CPI).
2.4 Model implementation
The demonstrating simulation study was implemented using
AnyLogic version 6.6 (XJ Technologies, Chicago, IL). In the
study, the simulation time was set at 5 simulation years, which
is reasonable to test the effects of an ACO demonstration.
The model generates one singlepayer agent hypothetically
representing CMS and two networks of provider agents (one
ACO network and one controlled network). Both the provider
networks are composed of three hospital agents and 15 PCP
agents. The ACO network is reimbursed under the shared
saving model, and the controlled network is reimbursed under
the traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) model. The
simulation model generated 10,000 patient agents and ran-
domly assigned them to the ACO networks or the controlled
network. For each patient agent, the values of its characteristic
variables were assigned on the basis of the joint distribution
estimated.
At the end of each simulation year, the payer agent
will collect the performance measures for both provider
networks, including the payment per CHF patient, the
hospital admission rate, and the CHF patient mortality
rate. Using those data, the payer agent will calculate
and distribute the shared saving to the provider agents
in the ACO network. Then, the ACO provider agents
will go through the decision-making process to deter-
mine if they will conduct the intervention in the next
simulation year.
The outputs of each simulation run are the average saving
to the payer agent per CHF patient per year, average annual
CHF-related admission rate, and CHF patient mortality rate
for each provider agent network over 5 simulation years. For
each setting of the model input parameters, 500 simulation
runs are performed to calculate the mean and 95 % level
confidence interval.
3 Simulation results, model validation, and scenario
analyses
A baseline analysis was conducted to compare the per-
formance of an ACO health network and a controlled
health network. Results below show the baseline model
(Section 3.1) and its validation (Section 3.2). Section 3.3
describes the multiple scenario analyses conducted to
examine the impacts of payment model designs and
provider characteristics on the outcome measures. To
examine the influence of provider types on the model
outputs, three scenarios were created. The setting of the
provider agent type in scenario one is the same with
that in the baseline model. In scenario two, all the
provider agents are profit-oriented, and in scenario three
all the provider agents are quality-oriented. In each
scenario, two key parameters of the shared saving pay-
ment model, i.e., SSR and SRH, were systematically
varied to determine an optimal payment model design.
The simulation was rerun for each combination of the
values of SSR and SRH in each scenario. A sensitivity
analysis was conducted to examine how the uncertainty
in other key model inputs influenced the model outputs
(Section 3.4).
Table 3 Healthcare costs
Service Amount paid by agent, USD (2011)
Payer agent Hospital agent PCP agent
CHF hospital cost −14,822 −1,186
Inpatient physician fee −2,668
Outpatient visit −85 34
Intervention cost per patient per year −648 −69
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3.1 Baseline model
In the baseline model, the three hospital agents in the ACO
network were a profit-oriented agent, a quality-oriented agent,
and a neutral agent. A PCP agent in the ACO network had
equal probability of being assigned as one of the three types.
The key payment model parameters, SSR and SRH, were set
at 0.5 and 0.7, respectively, which means half of the saving
was sharedwith provider agents and 70% of the shared saving
was distributed to hospital agents.
The ACO network performed better in the CHF-related
hospitalization rate and annual mortality rate of CHF patients
owing to the implementation of evidence-based care. The
annual CHF-related hospitalization rate was 63.94 % (95 %
CI: 63.74–64.14 %) for the ACO network and 72.46 % (95 %
CI: 71.78–73.14 %) for the controlled network. The annual
mortality rate of CHF patients was 18.41 % (95 % CI: 18.33–
18.49 %) for the ACO network and 19.72 % (95 % CI: 19.64–
19.80 %) for the controlled network. From the payer’s or the
CMS’s perspective, the average saving after distribution of the
shared saving was $765 (95%CI: $740–790) per CHF patient
per year, or a 5.65% saving compared with the $13,550 (95%
CI: $13,520–13,580) payment per CHF patient in the con-
trolled network. The saving in the ACO network was mainly
caused by the reduction in the hospitalization rate.
3.2 Model validation
Because the controlled network provides usual care and does
not conduct intervention, its CHF-related hospitalization rate
and mortality rate were used to validate the model with the
value reported in literature. The mortality rate for CHF pa-
tients reported in clinical trials ranges from 15 to 28 %
[46–48]. Note that their sample sizes are usually small, and
this could cause larger variation in their estimations. Hence,
the mortality rate in the model (19.72 %) is comparable to and
within the range of the mortality rates reported in the literature.
Derived from the results of Chen et al. [27] and Fang et al.
[26], the CHF-related hospitalization rate was estimated
around 68.6 %. In addition, the SOLVD study [49], a large
CHF trial whose estimates have been used by many CHF
simulation studies, reported an average annual hospitalization
rate of 72.9 %. The CHF-related hospitalization rate in the
model (72.46 %) is therefore comparable to that reported in
the literature.
3.3 Scenarios analyses
To examine the influence of provider types on the model
outputs, three scenarios were created. The setting of the pro-
vider agent type in scenario one is the same as that in the
baseline model. In scenario two, all the provider agents are
profit-oriented, and in scenario three, all the provider agents
are quality-oriented.
In each scenario, two key parameters of the shared saving
payment model were systematically varied to determine an
optimal payment (model design: SSR and SRH). The simula-
tion was rerun for each combination of the values of SSR and
SRH in each scenario. The results of the multiple runs were
analyzed and used to generate Figs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
Figure 4 shows that the shared saving to payer (SSP)
decreases as SSR increases in all three scenarios. When the
payer agent increases the SSR, the resulting additional finan-
cial incentives motivate more provider agents to conduct the
intervention, causing a reduction in annual CHF-related hos-
pital admission rate (shown in Fig. 5) and in annual CHF
patient mortality rate (shown in Fig. 6). The reduction in the
CHF-related hospital admission rate then generates more total
saving in the system; however, the SSP actually decreases
because more saving is shared with the provider agents.
Therefore, the payer agent is faced with a trade-off between
financial return and quality of care when determining the
value of SSR.
This scenario analysis also shows how provider agents in
different scenarios respond to changes in SSR. As shown in
Fig. 4, given the same SSR, scenario three (all the provider
agents are quality-oriented) always yielded higher financial
return to the payer agent, followed in order by scenario one
and scenario two. The profit-oriented provider agents are most
sensitive to the changes in SSR.
Fig. 4 Shared saving to the payer
by shared saving rate
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The effects of varying SRH given a certain SSR were
further examined. Analyzing the payer’s financial return
(i.e., SSP by SRH in scenario one), different patterns
were observed when the SSR was set at different
values. When the SSR was low, there was no clear
relationship between SSP and SRH (shown in Fig. 7
when the SSR was set at 0.1). Even if all the saving
was distributed to hospital agents (when SRH is 1), it
was not enough to cover the intervention cost for the
hospital agents and motivate their behavior changes.
When SSR was set to 0.5–0.8, a pattern emerged with a
concave shape, whereby the maximal financial return is
achieved when the SRH is 0.7 (shown in Fig. 8). Because
the effects of the intervention can be fully achieved only when
both the hospital agents and PCP agents are conducting it, the
0.7 value of SRH seems to be a good balance point that can
motivate both the hospital and PCP agents to conduct the
intervention and thus achieve a maximal financial return for
the payer agent.
When SSR was high (0.9), Fig. 9 shows a relatively flat
trend of SSR when SRH was around 0.5–0.7, and when the
SRH was greater than 0.7, SSR decreased as SRH increased.
Because the hospital agent had enough financial incentives to
conduct the intervention, a clear hospital agent behavior
switch was not observed as SRH increased from 0.5 to 0.7.
Similar patterns have also been observed in the other two
scenarios.
3.4 Sensitivity analysis
After the scenario analyses were conducted on the shared
saving payment model and provider types, a sensitivity anal-
ysis was conducted to examine how the uncertainty in other
key model inputs influenced the model outputs (using SSP).
In general, for each testing parameter, a higher value (in-
creased by 20 %) and a lower value (decreased by 20 %) were
tested.
From the results (shown in Fig. 10), SSP was most sensi-
tive to the effects of the intervention on hospital admission
rates. This was expected because the saving was mainly
generated by the reduction in hospitalization. Next, the effects
of the intervention on CHF patient mortality rate were
discussed. This is important because the quality outcomes
would also affect provider agents’ attitude toward the inter-
vention. Hospital intervention and operating costs, both af-
fecting hospital agents’ profit, were the other two sensitive
parameters. Because the hospital agent has the financial capa-
bility and covered the main cost of the intervention (such as
hiring care managers), SSPwas not sensitive to the parameters
on the PCP agent’s side.
Fig. 5 CHF-related
hospitalization by shared saving
rate
Fig. 6 CHF patient mortality rate
by shared saving rate
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4 Discussion
How to provide incentives to improve shared accountability in
U.S. healthcare systems is a difficult policy issue with a great
deal of uncertainties and trade-offs [50]. The CHF agent-based
simulation model demonstrated and quantified how different
implementations of the ACO and the shared saving payment
model can influence provider behavior regarding the
evidence-based intervention and therefore generated different
financial and quality outcomes. The model can help decision-
makers better understand the complexity and risks of ACO
design and facilitate more informed decision-making.
From CMS’s perspective, objectives include both control-
ling the cost and promoting the quality of care. The scenario
analysis showed that there was a trade-off between the payer’s
financial return and the quality outcomes when setting SSR.
The model can help decision-makers understand the con-
straints when determining SSR. In a hypothetical scenario, if
CMS wants to achieve a quality target to control the CHF-
related hospital admission rate to 64 % when all the providers
are profit-oriented, the model results indicate that CMS should
set SSR at 51 %, which would generate a $700 saving per
CHF patient per year (shown in Fig. 11). The payer therefore
would not achieve a financial objective, say $1,000 saving per
patient, at the same time. Hence, with the understanding of
these constraints, CMS can determine an SSR value that can
balance its two objectives.
Once the SSR is decided, the next step is to determine an
SRH value that can motivate both the hospital agents and PCP
agents to work together on the CHF intervention. Creating a
mechanism to promote cooperation between hospitals and
physicians is difficult, and an immature payment model may
incite tension and competition between hospitals and physi-
cians [51]. The simulation results have identified different
patterns of outcomes by SRH, which can help decision-
makers choose the optimal SRH value to maximize the out-
comes based on the configuration of SSR.
Fig. 7 Shared saving to payer by sharing rate to hospital with the shared
saving rate=0.1
Fig. 8 Shared saving to payer by sharing rate to hospital with shared saving rate from 0.5 to 0.8
Fig. 9 Shared saving to payer by sharing rate to hospital with the shared
saving rate=0.9
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The model can help analyze how provider types and prior-
ities could influence payment model designs. In the same
hypothetical scenario shown in Fig. 11, if all the providers
are quality-oriented, CMS can set SSR at 18 % to achieve the
same goal of controlling the CHF-related hospital admission
rate to 64 %. This setting will generate a $1,200 saving per
CHF patient per year instead of a saving of $700 when all the
providers are profit-oriented.
This result shows that the payer agent needs to provide
different levels of incentives for different types of providers to
achieve the same level of quality outcomes. This brings up the
problem that the more profit-oriented a provider agent is, the
more financial reward he/she will receive from the payer. This
problem could be addressed by expanding the payer’s strate-
gies to develop mixed motives to simulate all types of pro-
viders [52], such as aligning the payment with quality require-
ments, public reporting of quality performance, and initiating
education programs to increase awareness of quality of care
[53–55].
The sensitivity analysis showed that the outcomes were
most sensitive to the effects of the intervention, followed by
the intervention cost. Hence, selecting the cost-effective
Fig. 10 Sensitivity analysis to identify influence of model inputs uncertainty on the shared saving to payer output
Fig. 11 Effects of provider type
on shared savings
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intervention is critical for the success of an ACO. For broader
applications beyond CHF, ACO stakeholders need to wisely
choose improvement opportunities to pursue based on their
capability and current situations.
There are some limitations to the agent-based model for
CHF care. First, the model parameters are based on the best
information obtainable. The results reflect a national average
trend for Medicare patients. Adjustments should be made
when referring to some specific patient demographics, pro-
vider characteristics, and geographic locations. Second, the
weight for each behavior-predicting factor in the provider
decision module is not drawn from a survey of physicians.
A national physician’s behavior survey with information to
provide the values of these weights was not identified in a
literature search. Hence, the users of the model can configure
the provider agent parameters on the basis of the characteris-
tics of the providers with whom they are working.
5 Conclusion
The agent-based simulation model provides predictive analyt-
ics and recommendations for decision-makers to make in-
formed decisions on how to design an ACO and its corre-
sponding shared saving payment model, given their current
provider and patient population environment, to maximize the
desired outcomes.
The agent-based simulation model has identified critical
determinants of an optimal design for the payment model that
can motivate provider behavior changes to achieve maximum
financial and quality outcomes. The model has quantified the
trade-off between the payer’s financial return and the quality
outcomes, helping decision-makers configure the shared sav-
ing model based on their objectives.
The complexity and risks of the ACO model design gen-
erate a need for modeling and simulation tools that are flexi-
ble, capable, and user-adjustable to facilitate the design and
implementation of an ACO model for different disease condi-
tions, payment models, and provider and patient agent char-
acteristics. For future use of the model, users can, based on
their situations and objectives, configure the ACO design
parameters, generate corresponding patient and provider
agents, and then analyze different scenarios and optimize their
ACO models.
This study presents the promising application possibilities
of ABM, an increasingly important method to support policy
and management decision-making in broad and complex
healthcare systems. Different from aggregated-level modeling
methods, ABM can incorporate various goals and behaviors
of individual stakeholders. It is also capable of modeling agent
communication and interactions. These advantages make
ABM a closer approximation of the real world. Also, because
each agent represents a real entity in the health system (such as
a physician or a patient), healthcare practitioners are likely to
understand and accept the agent-based model. Therefore, the
solutions recommended and insights generated for an ACO
model design by the agent-based model increase the chance of
improving the real health system.
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